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How long will the marriage of Sino-Foreign JVs in China last?  
A theoretical and empirical investigation 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the factors affecting the longevity of international joint ventures (IJVs) in 
China and investigates the strategic interactions of the players in an IJV (foreign parent, local 
parent and IJV management) by adopting game theory and using empirical analysis based on 
national perceptions of time horizons. The theoretical part shows equilibria for the games 
played by the parents. The empirical evidence, based on a sample of Chinese-US and EU 
IJVs, as well as Chinese-Japanese and South Korean IJVs, is consistent with the propositions 
derived from our theoretical models. Our empirical findings show that the longevity of an IJV 
is affected by senior management control. Access to local knowledge is also a crucial factor 
affecting longevity. Furthermore, the degree of long-term orientation (LTO) of the parents 
influences the longevity of Sino-Foreign IJVs. The contributions made by both foreign and 
local parent firms are also found to influence the longevity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last thirty years, since China initiated economic reforms and an open-door policy, 
the country has been transformed from a poor nation almost entirely isolated from the global 
economy to the second largest economy in the world (Zhang and Liu, 2009). China’s 
dynamic transition and integration into the global economy has also brought fundamental 
changes in the way it conducts business (Tung et al., 2008). One feature of this change has 
been reflected in how to manage international joint ventures (IJVs) (Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw, 
2001). However, despite two decades of an intense East-West relationship through different 
forms of international collaboration, and despite intensive research on Chinese international 
joint ventures (Buck, Liu and Ott, 2010; Demir and Söderman, 2007; Fey and Beamish, 2001; 
Li et al., 2002; Luo, 1998; Puck et al., 2009; Roy, 2012; Shenkar, 2001; Yao et al., 2013), 
there is still a lack of consensuses on the factors contributing to the longevity of Sino-Foreign 
JVs. In particular, underexplored areas are the inter-relationship between senior management 
control from different nationalities and resources contributed by parent firms.  
 
Prior research on the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs has mainly focused on equity ownership, 
knowledge acquisition, cultural distance and contributions by parent firms (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1997; Fey and Beamish, 2001; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kaufmann and O’Neill, 
2007; Lin and Germain, 1998; Park and Ungson, 1997, Li et al., 2002; Roy, 2012; Shenkar, 
2001; Yao et al. 2013). However, most existing studies have examined these factors 
independently, and this offers an incomplete account of the reasons behind the longevity of 
Sino-Foreign JVs. In addition, empirically-driven studies dominate the existing literature, and 
few papers have offered theoretical models to formalize the inter-play between foreign and 
local partners (Ott, 2006). The strength of a game-theoretic approach is that it does not 
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analyze the impact of independent factors on IJV longevity in isolation, but it reveals the 
combined effects of multi-player decision-making by taking into account the 
interconnectedness of multiple players’ strategies and objectives. Compared to previous work 
which looked into contracting, signaling and repeated games (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2002; 
Ott 2006, 2013), we are using simultaneous and sequential move games and apply them to 
the longevity of IJVs. The game-theoretic approach to IJV longevity has thus been 
underexplored, and this represents an important research gap.  
 
Extending previous research on Sino-Foreign JVs, this paper aims to examine the multiple 
factors affecting the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs by applying the game-theoretic approach. 
In particular, we focus on the impact of senior management control in Sino-Foreign IJVs and 
the contributions made by both local and foreign parent firms on the longevity of Sino-
foreign JVs as well as the strategic interaction between management control and the 
contributions from local and foreign parents. In the context of Western and Asian partners, 
and so-called East-West and East-East IJVs, we also conduct theoretical modeling and 
empirical tests on whether one distinctive dimension of national culture, i.e. long-term 
orientation (LTO), interacts with senior management control and affects the longevity of 
Sino-Foreign JVs.  
 
This paper proposes two contributions to the literature. First, we go beyond the empirically 
dominated literature by constructing a theoretical model which formally represents the 
relationship between the characteristics of IJV partners and the longevity of IJVs. Hence, we 
offer a unique contribution by formalizing the factors contributing to the longevity of IJVs. A 
game theoretic approach enables us to theorize about the factors identified in the empirical 
literature and helps to provide new insights into the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs. Our 
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research thus complements prior studies based on empirical tests (Fey and Beamish, 2001; 
Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Li et al., 2002; Luo, 1998; Roy, 2012; Shenkar, 2001).  
 
Second, unlike previous research (Buck, Liu and Ott, 2010; Kaufmann and O’Neill, 2007; 
Park and Ungson, 1997), which either considers management control and contributions from 
parent firms in isolation or only examines the impact of cultural distance on IJVs’ longevity, 
we simultaneously analyze the interdependence of these factors, including senior 
management control, different degrees of LTO and contributions from parents. Such an 
approach enables us to consider not only the direct impact of senior management control and 
resource contributions on the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs, but also the inter-play between 
senior management control with different degrees of LTO and contributions from parent 
firms. Makino et al (2007) found that IJVs with strategic asset-seeking purposes last longer 
than those which are formed for resource, capital and market-seeking purposes. Our findings 
complement their findings by showing that high-tech IJVs with knowledge access purposes 
tend to last longer. Findings from this study help to enrich understanding of the factors 
determining the longevity of IJVs in China and generate significant theoretical and 
managerial implications. 
 
2. Literature review   
 
This research focuses on exploring the conditions which lead to the longevity of Sino-Foreign 
JVs in China. A Sino-Foreign JV is jointly owned by a local Chinese company (as local 
parent) and at least one MNE from the USA, Europe, Japan or any other Asian country (as 
foreign parent) (Luo, 1998). The formation of the IJV and the management affect the duration 
and stability of a joint venture, as well as the partner relationship, the interaction between the 
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partners and the ownership shares. Based on the definition of IJV (Ott, 2006), the parent 
relationship is seen in light of an IJV (as the child of both companies) and the partner 
relationship is referring to the relationship between the parent companies. This is similar to a 
family in which the parents are seen in relation to the child, whereas they are partners when it 
comes to their own relationship. Extensive research into factors affecting the survival of IJVs 
found that, in China, the uncertainty of environmental factors, cultural issues, knowledge 
acquisition and access, and contributions by parent firms are the main factors (Child and Yan, 
2003; Cuypers and Martin, 2010; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Li, Karakowsky and Lam, 
2002; Lin and Germain, 1998; Makino et al., 2007; Roy, 2012; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 
2002). In this section, we systematically review the existing literature based on the factors 
affecting IJV survival and provide the theoretical foundation to our study.  
 
2.1. Cultural distance of partners 
 
Cultural distance has always been a notable feature in IJVs and affects conflict resolution 
within IJVs as well as survival (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; Buck, Liu and Ott, 2010; Fey 
and Beamish, 2001; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Lin and Germain, 1998; Park and Ungson, 
1997;, Li et al, 1998; Li et al., 2002, Luo, 1998; Roy, 2012; Shenkar, 2001). The relevance of 
cultural distance with regard to the choice of partners (Luo, 1998) and entry modes 
(Kaufmann and O’Neill, 2007) was a key research element for the setting-up stage of IJVs in 
China.  
 
Lin and Germain (1998) proposed that cultural closeness benefited conflict resolution, and 
this benefit increased with IJV longevity. They argued that IJV longevity results in familiarity 
which not only produces an open, problem-solving approach to conflict resolution, but also a 
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greater willingness to support a partner's desired course of action. Another reported benefit of 
longevity is that partners would be less likely to rely on written agreements in conflict 
resolution than they would in short-term relationships. However, Hennart and Zeng (2002) 
proposed that the mixed findings concerning the impact of cultural distance and closeness on 
IJV survival are due to the fact that some of these studies did not control for external factors 
(rate of growth of country, industry changes and exchange rate volatility). More importantly, 
Makino et al (2007) found that cultural distance between the IJV partners is a source of 
misunderstandings and that smaller IJVs tend to face greater liability. The longevity of IJVs 
is, thus, a matter between the relationships of the players due to organizational and cultural 
complexity.  
 
Park and Ungson (1997) and Hennart and Zeng (2002) showed that the cultural mix of IJV 
partners affects the longevity of an IJV. Park and Ungson (1997) found that US-Japanese JVs 
survived longer than US-US JVs, whereas the latter showed that Japanese-Japanese JVs 
survived longer than US-Japanese JVs. These findings are consistent with the possibility that 
the level of LTO of the partners has an influence on longevity. Buck, et al. (2010) adopted the 
concept of LTO and examined whether foreign partners in Sino-Foreign JVs with different 
levels of LTO affected enterprise strategies. They established a link between partners’ 
different levels of LTO and strategic human resource management decisions taken by Sino-
Foreign JVs. In terms of working relationships in Sino-American JVs, Walsh et al. (1999) 
highlighted the fact that the views of American and Chinese managers in the same JV 
differed and this impaired their collaboration and activities which was evidence of cultural 
differences and their impact on the management of IJVs. 
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Lu and Xu (2006) investigated the growth and survival of Sino-Japanese JVs in China by 
focusing on the local parent and ‘decompartmentalized’ local advantage. Their findings 
helped to explain the legitimacy aspect of growth and survival connected to the local parent’s 
age and size. Li et al. (2002) compared the effect of cultural diversity and cultural distance 
between the Sino-Japanese and Sino-Western JVs in China and argued the benefits of joint 
management for longevity in comparison with overseas partners’ dominance in IJV 
management. They postulated that the effect of cultural distance disappears the more 
advanced the firms are in international expansion. Their results showed that cultural distance 
affects transaction efficiency, the selection of location and the sharing of firm resources.  
 
However, Hanvanich et al (2005) found a different rationale and proposed that the preference 
of an IJV as ownership strategy occurs when national culture differences are high, since in 
the long-term an MNE ought to acquire the local partner’s share of the equity JV. They 
argued that the increase in national culture differences mean increased unfamiliarity of local 
knowledge for MNEs. This would lead to the need of a local partner to understand the 
environment. Hanvanich et al (2005) stressed the impact of cultural differences on learning 
and knowledge acquisition. In addition, Makino et al (2007) point to the fact that cultural 
distance as a source of misunderstanding and miscommunication affects the longevity of an 
IJV.  
 
This section highlighted that cultural differences between IJV partners can have an impact on 
resource sharing, the flow of knowledge, the learning process, and most importantly the 
longevity of the IJV. What is absent in the existing literature is that there is a lack of research 
which goes beyond empirical testing. To address this research gap, we use cultural 
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differences as antecedent constructs for longevity and take LTO as a dynamic component for 
designing cultural differences between the players in a game theoretic model.  
 
2.2. Contributions of the parents 
 
Contributions made by parent firms are also a critical factor affecting the longevity of IJVs. 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2002) found in the repeated games of Sino-Japanese JVs that most 
local partners in developing countries contribute local knowledge, e.g. by facilitating local 
government relations, registering ventures, renting land and recruiting workers. They argue 
that business expertise such as technology and access to local marketing channels become 
more significant contributions after the formative period and, therefore, more credible threats. 
The authors reasoned that if local partners do not have this expertise, they are likely to be 
‘held up’ by the foreign partner who can contribute most rent to the IJV. If the main 
contribution of the foreign partner is technology transfer, and over time the IJV does not 
depend on the foreign partner’s continuous supply of technology, the foreign partner could be 
held up, and the local partner could appropriate the most rent from the IJV. Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2002) stressed that partner learning creates a credible threat since IJVs facilitate 
knowledge acquisition by the parents. Yeheskel et al (2004) considered learning as part of a 
post-corporation interaction between the IJV partners in which they benefit from efficiently 
interacting in the pre-corporation stage. This interaction should protect against opportunistic 
behavior.  
 
Lu and Beamish (2006) found in their investigation of Sino-Japanese JVs that a consideration 
of the characteristics of resources contributed by IJV partners may contribute to an 
understanding of longevity. In order to avoid the obsolescence of IJVs, they suggested that 
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parent firms should contribute a diverse and continuing set of resources. Similarly, Makino et 
al. (2007) considered Sino-Japanese JVs and suggested that IJVs formed for strategic asset-
seeking purposes tended to have a greater likelihood of planned termination, but a lesser 
longevity than those formed for resource/labor, capital and market-seeking purposes. This all 
suggests that termination decisions are endogenous to the initial purpose of formation. 
Makino et al. (2007) concluded that the international experience of Japanese parents had a 
negative influence on longevity, whereas other studies found that the international experience 
of local Chinese parents had a positive influence on longevity (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 
2004).  
 
Newburry et al (2003) found that there is less disagreement between parents and their IJVs 
when the IJVs are older, larger and when there is a greater degree of similarity between 
parent company goals. This is in favor of our assumption regarding the longevity of IJVs. On 
the other hand, Fetscherin et al (2010) concluded that increased levels of JV autonomy have 
implications for the trust relationship between the foreign headquarters, the JV and the 
domestic partner. They even found that the overall transaction costs of doing business in 
China remain at a significant scale for 30 years even after attracting foreign investors.  
 
Reviewing the prior literature in this area, we have identified a missing link between the 
contribution of the IJV parents and its implications for longevity, particularly the contribution 
of knowledge as a source of conflict. This will be the focus of our theoretical enquiry based 
on game theory and empirical tests.  
 
2.3. Knowledge access and acquisition from the parents  
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In a recent publication Li et al (2013) classified and distinguished knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge accession for strategic alliances. We can apply their definitions to the case of 
IJVs. For example, partners A and B can provide knowledge to an IJV, but do not expect the 
IJV to give something back to the parents. This is the process of putting knowledge into the 
IJV. This means that the nature of knowledge accession is not reliant on learning but that 
partner A and partner B are interested in the amalgamation of existing knowledge rather than 
absorbing new knowledge. The combined specialized knowledge could lead to a new 
product. On the other hand, knowledge acquisition emphasizes the partners’ aim of acquiring 
knowledge in order to learn, which means that new knowledge flows back to the parents. Li 
et al. (2013) stressed that partners would be protective of their knowledge, particularly when 
they compete.  
 
Hanvanich et al’s (2005, p. 409) results similarly stressed that ‘in culturally different 
situations firms in high technology industries face difficulties in both acquiring and 
protecting their knowledge’. Tsang (1999) at an earlier stage of analyzing MNEs and their 
subsidiaries considered expatriates in local environments as agents of knowledge transfer and 
learning. Similarly, Inkpen and Beamish (1997) viewed the foreign parent as part of this 
process. 
 
Inkpen and Beamish (1997) suggested that IJVs are formed to exploit inter-firm differences 
in skills, reporting a high correlation between the acquisition of local knowledge and 
longevity. They argued that (1997, p.199) ‘Once the foreign partner has acquired local 
knowledge, unless the local partner is contributing other valuable and inimitable skills to the 
JV, the rationale for cooperation will be eliminated. Instability may be the result, although 
attachment between the partners may moderate shifts in bargaining power. Thus, the 
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acquisition of local knowledge is an enabling device for the foreign partner to operate 
anonymously’. The authors, therefore, suggested that local partners may take steps to ensure 
that they contribute more than local knowledge, thus reducing instability. This is consistent 
with their advice in an earlier paper that if the foreign parent chooses access to local 
knowledge without acquisition as a possible strategy, then the IJV could be stable, enhancing 
the competitive advantage (Beamish and Inkpen, 1995). Wang et al. (2004) investigated a 
parent company’s capacity and willingness to transfer knowledge in the context of knowledge 
contributed and acquired by the parent and the Chinese subsidiary. Similarly, Demir and 
Söderman (2007) found that foreign CEOs run the risk of being out-learned, internally as 
well as externally. Their findings strengthen the view that the accumulation of experience and 
skills in transition economies evolves sequentially.  
 
Drawing on insights from transaction cost economics and institutional theory, Puck, 
Holtbrügge and Mohr (2009) explore why and when an IJV is converted into a wholly owned 
subsidiary in China and have found that the acquisition of local knowledge by the foreign 
firm and isomorphic pressures from the foreign firm network are crucial factors affecting the 
likelihood of a conversion. Their findings indicate that when foreign firms possess local 
knowledge, the chance increases that these firms will change their ownership mode after their 
entry into a foreign market. Hence, complementary assets influence the existence and 
survival of IJVs.  
 
Besides the role of knowledge acquisition discussed above, Fang and Zou (2010) suggest that 
a foreign firm’s absorptive learning capacity might increase its dependency on the local 
partner through the enhancement of joint learning capacity. On the other hand, they found 
that the local partner’s absorptive learning capacity reduces its dependence on the foreign 
12 
 
firm. Therefore, local and foreign partners show differences in their absorptive learning 
activities, and Fang and Zou (2010) argue that this dependence asymmetry drives IJV 
instability.  
 
Recent findings on knowledge acquisition (Park, 2011; Yao et al., 2013) highlight knowledge 
acquisition in IJVs as an efficient means of learning or absorbing technology and tacit know-
how that is organizationally embedded. Park (2011) shows that it is not only the absorptive 
capacity of the IJV but also of the knowledge transfer capacity of the MNEs that is crucial to 
knowledge acquisition. An IJV’s success in learning from foreign parents is accordingly 
dependent on knowledge transfers. Knowledge transfer from foreign parent to IJV adds 
another angle to the discussion of knowledge acquisition in IJVs. Yao et al. (2013, p. 224) 
explored further IJV knowledge absorption effectiveness and defined this as the ‘aptitude of 
the IJV to organize and share existing knowledge, gather and assimilate each partner’s 
complementary knowledge, and collectively generate new knowledge that otherwise would 
not have existed, fully mediates the relationship between knowledge complementarity and 
new product development.’ These authors emphasize that Sino-Foreign JVs are a growing 
and significant economic phenomenon which most foreign firms and local Chinese firms 
establish to gain access to each other’s complementary knowledge bases (Luo, 2000). These 
observations are in line with our assumptions that local Chinese firms seek foreign partners’ 
knowledge of R&D and technology, whereas foreign firms are interested in local partner’s 
knowledge in managing local expertise. Where IJVs are motivated by knowledge transfer and 
knowledge acquisition, they are stable as long as the partners have not acquired the missing 
knowledge.  
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This literature review has shown the importance of culture, contribution, control and 
knowledge acquisition and access for the longevity of IJVs. Foreign partners tend to acquire 
the knowledge of the local partner. Once the foreign parent has acquired local knowledge, 
then the incentive to stay in the joint venture is reduced. The local parent can, however, also 
provide knowledge access channels through local senior management control. The longevity 
of an IJV is linked to the knowledge provision of the parents. We go beyond existing 
literature by connecting knowledge access and provision with the strategic relevance of the 
partner’s time perception and thus long-term orientation is a necessary condition for 
longevity. The degree of LTO directly influences longevity. In other words, the local parent 
should provide access to local knowledge by opening channels through which local 
knowledge can be shared with foreign partners. Additionally, the provision of local 
knowledge or complementary assets should include a wide range of resources such as 
technology and production which may help contribute to the survival of an IJV.  
 
Drawing upon the necessary conditions for longevity in IJVs identified in the existing 
literature, we are now able to develop the conceptual framework and present it in Figure 1. 
This conceptual approach considers the local and foreign parent having a different cultural 
background based on their time horizons or LTO. Variations in time perspectives have a 
crucial impact on the strategies of IJVs, with implications for resource contributions. 
Extending the existing literature above, we propose that resource access is a more decisive 
factor contributing to longevity than resource acquisition. The longevity concept, therefore, 
uses the provision of local senior management in an IJV as a channel for local knowledge 
access. Similarly, we consider contributions to technology, production and finance from 
foreign and local parents as key factors affecting survival.  
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Insert Figure 1 near here 
 
The underlying conceptual framework, therefore, considers the acquisition of knowledge of 
the other party through learning in an IJV a potential source of early termination, whereas 
sharing local knowledge via local senior management reduces the premature termination of 
the IJV. The longevity of an IJV is dependent on the degree of LTO of the parents, their 
strategic interactions regarding the provision of resources as contributions to the IJV, and 
finally the interaction between the choice of senior management and management control 
related to the contributions. We adopt a game theoretic modeling approach and use the 
insights discussed above to capture the strategic interactions and show the moves in an IJV 
related to longevity.   
 
2.4. Strategic interactions between the players – Game Theory 
 
In an IJV we have three players (local, foreign and IJV) who make their moves and use their 
strategies to reach an outcome which not only benefits them individually, but also the whole 
venture (Ott, 2006; 2013). These complex decision-making scenarios have an impact on the 
longevity of any IJV. Game theory is a strategic tool to consider decision-making between 
many players, with their strategies and pay-offs.  Within the international business (IB) field, 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) embedded their research in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. This game theoretic approach had the advantage of analyzing the strategic interaction 
between the players. The IB literature has also used game theory for static, simultaneous 
move situations regarding MNEs and market structures (Graham, 1998), dynamic games for 
MNEs, national states bargaining (Agmon, 2003; Luo, 2004) and MNE knowledge spill-
overs (Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers, 2007). Casson (1994) used the strategic interaction 
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and equilibrium concept of a leader-follower relationship, and Ott (2006) applied the 
incomplete information concept to games between IJV players. Some studies use game 
theory as a tool to analyze the strategic interactions between at least two players, and the 
moves or strategies of each player connected to the other player’s decision (Casson, 1994; 
Myerson, 1991; Ott, 2013). The pay-off for each player shows the equilibrium path and the 
outcome of the game as a combination of co-operation and self-interest. We, therefore, use 
simultaneous move and sequential move games to analyze the decision-making in IJVs with 
many players and coalitions. This can be referred to as a multi-person decision-making 
scenario in IJVs. We are now able to use the cultural distance, contributions and control over 
knowledge access and acquisition in combination with strategic interactions in IJVs to 
determine longevity. 
 
Ott (2013) suggested using dynamic models of game theory to show the relevance for real-
life International Business problems. We follow her approach and start with a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to show the simultaneous choices. Expanding game theoretical models towards 
dynamics, we use the LTO of the partners as a determining factor for the strategies and the 
pay-offs (length of duration). This offers the elegance of a logical tool and enables us to 
combine it with the real-life background. The notation and rules of the games are explained 
below.  
 
In the following section we use the strategic form game to show strategic interactions 
between the partner firms of an IJV based in China with simultaneous moves, and the 
extensive form games for sequential moves. We use a long-term and short-term lens to 
analyze its contribution to the longevity of an IJV. The outcome of the static and the dynamic 
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games should help to generate insights into the strategies of a multi-person decision-making 
scenario and its impact on the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs.  
 
3. The Model 
 
There are many ways of showing the longevity of IJVs. The literature has shown that partner 
selection, bargaining, contracting and reputation have an impact on the duration of 
international joint ventures. Combining the players with their strategies in static and dynamic 
games offers a way of looking forward and reasoning backward to come up with results to 
anticipate the longevity. Ott (2013) suggested applying game theory to international business 
topics which are dealing with strategic interactions between different players. Sino-Foreign 
Joint Ventures can be seen in this respect as combining managerial and economic strategies. 
Their longevity is a phenomenon. We go on to strategically analyze this phenomenon and 
base the pay-offs on the duration of an IJV. 
 
In this section, we develop formal models to analyze the strategic decisions of IJVs in China 
which have long-term implications and an effect on longevity. Hofstede and Bond (1988) 
proposed LTO to accommodate a distinctive dimension of the Chinese culture and an Asia-
wide phenomenon. This dimension relates to Confucian values that have an impact on family 
relationships, work relationships, governmental relationships and trust-building. Creating and 
maintaining long-term, trusting relationships in China influences decision-making and the 
survival of IJVs where foreign partners may have different degrees of LTO, e.g. short term 
orientation (STO) in US-EU companies.  
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The longevity of IJVs is susceptible to analysis in terms of time orientation. For example, 
previous studies have examined the impact of cultural values on IJV stability (Sim and Ali, 
2000), and based on these one expects that LTO may influence the longevity of IJVs. For 
example, Japan and South Korea have a national culture of high LTO, with national measures 
of 80 and 75 respectively (Hofstede, 2007). However, the USA and the EU have relatively 
low LTO (29 for the USA; within the EU, ranging from 20 in the UK to 32 in Poland). We, 
therefore, identify cultural clusters comprising US and EU investors in IJVs from countries 
with relatively low LTO (Javidan and House, 2002), and partners from these countries may 
be expected to experience a shorter longevity of IJVs. On the other hand, IJV partners from 
an Asian cluster (South Korea and Japan) may be expected to contribute a long-term 
perspective to IJVs. 
 
Let us consider the following games and their concepts based on Myerson’s (1991) game 
notation as this fits the purpose of analyzing IJVs in China from various angles necessary to 
understand the longevity and the factors leading to stability. The first part will be a strategic 
form game (Nash Equilibrium), and the second part deals with the extensive form game of a 
leader-follower relationship (Stackelberg Equilibrium).  
 
3.1. Strategic Form Games 
 
We can denote the strategic form game as  
))(,)(,( NiiNii
IJV uCN   
where N is the set of players. In our case N= (For, Loc, IJV), the foreign players could be US, 
EU, or Japanese and South Korean foreign parents; the local parent is Chinese and the joint 
venture is either Sino-US and EU or Sino-Japan and South Korea. Ci, is the set of strategies 
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for player i and ui: C→R is the utility payoff function for player i. For our purpose, we use 
the set of strategies for each player as {(choose senior management locally, choose senior 
management from Foreign parent); (contribute finance; contribute local production); (offer 
ownership share, do not offer ownership share)}. In terms of utility payoff functions, we 
focus on the longevity of the IJV.  
 
This part of the configuration between the parents marks a crucial step towards clustering the 
foreign partner as the headquarters (HQ) and the local partner as host in relation to the 
countries where the parents have different levels of LTO. Thus, the general classification of 
IJV parents as having origins in the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea leads to significant 
implications with regard to senior management control, and information asymmetries.  
 
Let us now move to consider senior management’s choices in a strategic form game with 
complete information. Player I (Chinese parent) and Player II (Japanese or Korean parent) 
simultaneously move and offer their choice of senior management. The set of strategies CChina 
for player I and CJapan/Korea for player II and uChina is the utility pay off function for the 
Chinese parent and uJapan/Korea for player II. The payoffs are using the longevity of the IJV 
based on Hofstede’s LTO index for the chosen countries. We assume that LTO is a good 
indicator for the payoffs which will be measured in years for the longevity of IJVs.  
 
We choose the simultaneous move situation to show the conflict between self-interest and 
cooperative behavior which is typical of an IJV. As these are the relevant questions in the 
start-up phase of an IJV, we use this to show the situation of partners who do not know each 
other and have no reputational effect to base their partner selection on. The Chinese and 
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foreign parents have two strategies (Chinese senior management, Japanese/Korean senior 
management) with the payoffs {(10,10), (15,0); (0,15); (9,9)} presented in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 near here 
 
The results of the game show that there exists a Pareto-optimal solution (10, 10) for the 
choice of the Chinese senior management, as this affects the length of the IJV, which means 
that no player is better off than the other. Japanese/Korean senior management is likely to 
have a slightly shorter time horizon (9, 9). Even so, Japanese and Korean LTO (80 and 75) is 
higher than all other possible foreign parents from the TRIAD region, but still below China’s 
LTO (118). We have chosen the longevity of the IJV (in years) as a pay-off and the strategies 
of the players (parents) were either to choose senior management from the local or foreign 
parent. The longevity of the IJV is dependent on the decisions of a Chinese senior 
management team, shown in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 near here 
 
Similar to the Sino-Japanese JVs, we choose the pay-offs equivalent to the LTO for US-EU 
(29 for the USA; within the EU, ranging from 20 in the UK to 32 in Poland) and again the 
Chinese LTO for a Chinese Senior management with ten years in equilibrium. Instead of 
choosing a US-EU senior management which will bring about duration of five years (the 
normal length of Sino-Western JVs), the solution goes clearly for a ten year longevity with 
Chinese senior management.  
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In strategic form, it pays off to choose a Chinese senior manager due to access to local 
expertise, knowledge of bureaucracy and legal requirements for control rights. In terms of 
long-term and short-term perspectives, the payoffs are considered under the assumption that 
the Chinese senior management contributes to the length of an IJV. We have formally shown 
how the LTO of senior managers is likely to affect the longevity of IJVs, and predict that 
foreign partners from a country with a low LTO tend to have a short longevity of IJVs with 
Chinese partners. Hence, based on the results, we derive two propositions below.  
 
Proposition 1a:  The longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs is positively associated with the 
degree of management control by Chinese senior managers.  
   
Proposition 1b: The longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs is negatively associated with the 
degree of management control by foreign senior managers.  
 
3.2 Extensive Form Games or Dynamic Games with Complete Information 
 
The next level of the analysis embraces control rights, contributions and management 
decisions in a multi-person decision-making situation of complete information. The key 
features of the following dynamic games with complete information are that the players move 
in sequence, all previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen, and the payoffs 
for the players are common knowledge. 
Assumption: The players know each other and their preferences, but do not know their moves 
yet. It is a sequential move game with a leader-and-follower situation (Stackelberg 
Equilibrium). 
 
21 
 
The extensive form game has the following notation, and we will adapt it for the IJVs in 
China: 
))(,)(*,,( NiiNii
e uCSN   
where N is the set of players. In our case N= (For, Loc, IJV), the foreign players FOR are 
considered to be US-American, European, Japanese and South Korean foreign parents, the 
local parent LOC is Chinese, and the joint venture is either Sino-US/EU or Sino-
Japanese/Korean. Let S* be the information node, Ci, is the set of strategies for player i and 
ui: C→R is the utility payoff function for player i. We use a set of strategies for each player 
as {(offer ownership share, do not offer ownership share); (choose shared management, 
choose dominant parent management); (choose senior management from Local, choose 
senior management from Foreign parent); (contribute finance; contribute local production); 
(set up R&D unit, set up Distribution unit)}.  
 
Considering the contributions to the IJV, the parents can theoretically contribute either 
technology, marketing or finance or each of these three contributions together (Ott, 2006). In 
this context the configuration of the parents could look like the following matrix:  
 
Insert Table 3 near here 
 
PContribution (PL, PF) = {(cT, cT), (cT, cM), (cT, cF), (cM, cT), (cM, cM), (cM, cF), (cF, cT), (cF, cM), 
(cF, cF)} 
 
The contributions of the parents are necessary because of their impact on ownership ratios, 
bargaining power, return on investment and the strategic configuration of the IJV itself, see 
below. The local and foreign parent could each contribute technology (research lab), 
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marketing (marketing units, distribution) or finance (contractual IJV). The financial 
contributions could lead to a particular strategic configuration in which one parent just 
intends to achieve a particular rate of return on investment, whereas the other contributes to 
the value-adding process. For our purposes, we would like to investigate the effects of local 
contributions being local production P and finance F and of foreign contributions being 
technology T and finance F. These combinations have not been modeled and analyzed so far. 
In this paper, we focus on PContribution (PL, PF) = {(cP, cT), (cP, cF), (cF, cT), (cF, cF)}. We use the 
contributions for the sequential equilibrium concept to show their influence on control and 
senior management choices.  
 
The order of the play specifies the sets of strategy for each information node. In terms of 
utility payoff functions, we focus on the longevity of the IJV. The extensive form game with 
a sequential equilibrium concept shows the response function of Player 2, after Player 1 
moved first. We can therefore model the interactions between the Chinese local firm and the 
second player being the foreign firm from Japan, Korea, US or EU.  
 
3.2.1. Extensive Form Games for the Choice of Senior Management 
 
Insert Figure 2 near here 
 
We can therefore show the order of the play for the game above as: 
 
1) Player 1 chooses an action c1 from the feasible set C1. 
2) Player 2 observes c1 and then chooses an action c2 from the feasible set C2. 
3) The payoffs are u1(c1,c2) and u2(c1,c2). 
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We solve this game by backward induction, which means that player 2 (foreign) moves at the 
second stage of the game with player 1 having chosen c1 before her. 
 
)(max 2'12
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ccu
Cc 
        (1) 
 
Assuming that for each action c1 from the feasible set C1, player 2 has a unique solution 
R2(c1), then this is player 2’s reaction function to player 1’s move. Since player 1 can do the 
same, she could anticipate player 2’s reaction to each action: 
))((max 1'11
11
cRcu
Cc   
      (2) 
Player 1’s optimization outcome is 
*
1c  and the outcome of this game is )((
*
1'
*
1 cRc  
The equilibrium would be (10,10) if we use the same years of duration as payoffs for the 
extensive form game, as for the static game, only with a sequential move structure.  
 
3.2.2. Extensive Form Game for the Interaction between Contribution and Senior 
Management 
 
Insert Figure 3 near here 
 
We can therefore show the order of the play for the game above as: 
1) Player 1 (Local) chooses from the strategy set c1 (production, local knowledge) 
2) Player 2 (Foreign) observes c1 and then chooses an action c2 (finance, technology) 
from the feasible set C2. 
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3) Player 1 (Local) observes player 2’s choice (and recall her own choice in stage 1) 
and then chooses and action c3 (production unit, senior management).  
4) Payoffs for both players (UChina; UForeign) 
 
Let player 1 (Chinese) move first by choosing a contribution: production or local knowledge. 
Player 2 (Foreign) will move with a contribution of either finance or technology. Player 1 can 
then move further choosing a local production unit with technology or choice of senior 
management with player 2’s finance contribution. We solve the game by beginning with 
player 1’s second move in which either production unit or senior management will be her 
choice. The decision is dependent on player 2’s move to provide either finance or technology 
which is again dependent on whether the local player provides production or local 
knowledge. For player 1, it would make sense to contribute production knowledge for a 
production unit and local knowledge via providing the senior management consistent with 
our assumption that access to local knowledge should happen through local senior 
management. This would mean that the local player would only be better off in these cases 
and otherwise have a 0 pay-off. The response function for player 2 would be like in the 
previous case  
R2(c1). We will, therefore, have for player 1 the following response function to consider 
R3(c1, c2) and therefore R3(c1, R2(c1,)).  
 
Assuming that for each action c1 from the feasible set C1, player 2 has a unique solution 
R2(c1), then this is player 2’s reaction function to player 1’s move. Since player 1 can do the 
same, she could anticipate player 2’s reaction to each action: 
))();,((max 122'131
11
cRccRu
Cc    (3) 
or 
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Player 1’s optimization outcome is 
*
1c  and the outcome of this game is 
))();(,(( *12'
*
12
*
13 cRcRcR  
 
We can interpret the results of the model above in the following way. The contributions from 
parent organizations may be associated with the longevity of IJVs (Yan and Gray, 1994). We 
expect that the longevity or stability of IJVs depends on the resources contributed by each 
parent firm. More specifically, the type of resources contributed will reinforce a parent’s 
expectation of control over the joint venture’s operation. In other words, if a parent makes 
extensive contributions of finance, the parent will expect a high level of control, and hence, 
influence the longevity of the IJV. The extent to which a foreign parent provides finance and 
the local parent contributes to local production influences the stability of IJVs. There is not 
only a direct impact, but also an interaction effect between contributions made by both parent 
companies and management control. The more production contributed by a local parent, the 
smaller role played by local Chinese senior managers in the stability of IJVs. Production from 
a local parent offsets the role of local senior managers in maintaining IJVs’ stability. On the 
other hand, the more finance contributed by foreign partners, the more likely it is that foreign 
senior managers desire a longer longevity of IJVs. Hence, we can derive the following 
propositions related to parents’ contributions and the interaction effects between 
contributions and management control by different JV partners.  
 
Proposition 2a: The longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs is positively associated with the 
contribution to production by the local Chinese JV parent. 
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Proposition 2b: The longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs is positively associated with the 
contribution to finance by foreign partners in JVs’ configuration.   
 
Proposition 3a: Production contributed by a local parent negatively moderates the 
role of Chinese senior managers in the longevity of IJVs. 
 
Proposition 3b: Finance contributed by foreign partners positively moderates the 
role of foreign senior managers in the longevity of IJVs.     
  
4. Data Analysis 
 
In this section, we mainly test the propositions derived from the game models. We examine 
whether the role of Chinese and foreign senior managers in IJVs and the interaction effect 
between contributions and senior managers affect the longevity of IJVs. Similarly, whether 
the contributions from both parties have an impact on the longevity is also investigated. We 
are particularly interested in whether Chinese partners put more emphasis on stability, or the 
foreign senior managers would prefer to have a short duration of IJVs.  
 
To obtain data to test the propositions derived from the theoretical models, we conducted a 
postal questionnaire survey of Sino-Foreign JVs in a single survey from December 2006 to 
April 2007. An abbreviated list of the main questions is provided in the appendix. We limited 
the sample to high-tech industries in order to control for the impact of industrial affiliation on 
strategic decisions across the three nationalities of IJVs. In addition, we controlled for 
industrial sub-sectors within the high-tech sector. We obtained useable responses on the 
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longevity of IJVs and ownership as well as strategic configurations in production, R&D and 
marketing within IJVs. Three cities, Beijing, Tianjin and Qingdao, were surveyed due to the 
concentration of particular types of IJVs in these regions. Specifically, Japanese and Korean 
JVs mainly locate in the Pan Bohai region that includes these three cities, accounting for 67% 
of Korean investment and 40% of Japanese investment in China (Wang, 1998). Selecting the 
sample firms from the three cities enabled us to avoid the problem of the under-representation 
of Sino-Korean JVs in other regions. According to lists obtained from Beijing, Tianjin and 
Qingdao Industry and Commerce Bureaus, in 2006 there were 2,126 IJVs in Beijing, 1,075 in 
Tianjin and 461 in Qingdao. Each of these IJVs was approached, and a willingness to 
participate in this survey was indicated by 2,053 IJVs, together representing 56% of the IJV 
population in these three cities.  
It is commonly recognized that research design and data collection cannot apply to different 
countries in precisely the same way due to cultural differences (Mullen, 1995; Singh, 1995; 
Cavusgil and Das, 1997). Thus, it is necessary to consider the issue of data equivalence in 
research design and data collection. In order to achieve conceptual and cultural equivalence, 
we have taken some steps following previous studies (Luk et al., 2005).  
 
First, we consulted our Chinese research collaborators at an early stage of the questionnaire’s 
development and asked them to confirm whether the issues, such as cultural differences and 
duration of IJVs, exist and are interpreted similarly in China. Our research collaborators 
confirmed the existence of such issues and also provided some related studies published in 
Chinese journals, indicating that the theme of our research has already been established in 
China. Second, we paid great attention to language and context comparability. For example, 
the questionnaire was translated from English into Mandarin Chinese. Then it was back-
translated by three Chinese Professors in Beijing to ensure its validity and accuracy. Third, a 
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pilot study was carried out in two workshops, involving groups of 6 and 8 senior managers of 
three categories of Sino-Foreign JVs. These senior managers completed the questionnaire and 
identified ambiguous questions. We modified the questionnaire accordingly, based on the 
feedback received from the workshops, and copies were mailed to 2,053 IJVs.  
 
Two professional research assistants in Beijing were engaged to conduct postal questionnaire 
surveys during 2006-2007. Given the subject of this investigation, a key informant approach 
was adopted, with the respondent being the CEO or senior manager of the surveyed IJVs. The 
research assistants made follow-up phone calls and visits to about 100 firms. A total of 213 
useable questionnaires were received (a 10.4% response rate for the sample surveyed) with 
104 IJVs with US-EU partners and 109 IJVs with other Asian co-owners (Japan and Korea).  
 
The possibility of non-response bias was checked by comparing the characteristics of the 
respondents with those of the population. The calculated t-statistics for the number of 
employees and local Chinese control were statistically insignificant, indicating no significant 
differences between respondent and non-respondent firms.   
 
Dependent variable  
The longevity of IJVs was measured by the period since the founding of the IJVs until the 
year when the survey was conducted.  
 
Independent variables  
To estimate foreign influence on the longevity of these IJVs, we used the percentage of 
foreign senior managers and Chinese senior managers on the boards of IJVs as a measure of 
the degree of foreign and local management control. We also used a dummy variable to 
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measure the contributions by local JV parent which takes the value of one if a local IJV 
parent contributes to production of their IJV and zero otherwise. A dummy variable was 
created based on whether foreign partners contribute to the financing of IJVs, taking the 
value of one if foreign partners provide finance and zero otherwise.  
 
Control variables. 
We controlled for firm size measured by number of employees and also for foreign 
ownership stakes in IJVs. A dummy variable was created for the national cluster of US-
European/Chinese JVs, whereas Japanese-Korean/Chinese JVs were used as a baseline. As 
the questionnaire survey was conducted in different cities, we also controlled for location by 
introducing two dummy variables for Tianjin and Qingdao. We also included industry 
dummies in the estimation and detected IJVs’ configurations in terms of whether they had 
joint marketing units. We created a dummy variable which took the value of one if an IJV 
had a marketing unit and zero otherwise.  
Common methods variance may be a potential problem when the data are generated from the 
same respondents of an organization at the same time. To minimize the effect of common 
method variance, we took the following steps. First, the dependent variable, the longevity of 
IJVs, can be independently verified from other sources and thus is “objective” in nature. We 
also ensured the anonymity of the respondents to reduce evaluation apprehension (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). Second, the survey uses multiple item constructs. Response biases are more 
likely to occur at the item level than at the construct level. Third, the main hypotheses involve 
interaction effects. Complex relationships between the dependent and independent variables 
are not part of the respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang, Witteloostuijn and Eden, 2009). This 
helps reduce the risks of common method variance. Finally, common methods bias was tested 
by performing the single factor test proposed by Podsakoff and Organ (1986). We conducted 
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a factor analysis with all the variables used in this study and obtained a four-factor solution. 
The largest factor explained only 26.58% of the variance. Hence, common methods bias is 
not a major concern in our data. 
 
To test the above-mentioned propositions, we adopted a count model approach as the 
dependent variable (the longevity of IJVs) is a non-negative number. We estimated the 
Poisson regression model first and then tested for over-dispersion. The result based on the 
approach suggested by Wooldridge (1990) shows evidence of over-dispersion as the 
coefficient of the predicted dependent variable is statistically significant at the 0.05% 
significance level. Therefore, we estimated a negative binomial model (Green, 1997).  
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis and the matrix of correlation 
are presented in Table 4 and show the average longevity of IJVs (nearly 10 years) and size of 
firms (481 employees) in the sample. Foreign partners, on average, account for 56% of IJV 
ownership. The average number of senior Chinese and foreign managers (of different 
nationalities) in each IJV is six and four. We also checked for multicollinearity using 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) which are well below 10, showing that multicollinearity is 
not a concern in our estimations. 
 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
 
We included the main independent variables first and then added interaction terms between 
senior management, production contribution and financial contribution by local and foreign 
partners. The results presented in the full model (Model 4) in Table 5 show that the longevity 
of IJVs is positively associated with the variable of mainland Chinese senior managers in 
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IJVs. This result (β=0.028; p<0.01) indicates that the extent of Chinese management control 
has a significant, positive impact on the length of IJVs. Hence, the result is in line with 
Proposition 1a. This suggests that other things being equal, a 1% increase in Chinese 
management control leads to an increase in IJV longevity by 2.8% (e(0.028)-1=0.028). 
Moreover, the results suggest that the percentage of foreign senior managers in Sino-Foreign 
IJVs has a negative association with the longevity of IJVs and is statistically significant (β = -
0.042; p<0.01). This result shows that others being equal, a 1% increase in foreign senior 
management reduces IJV duration by 4.3% (e(0.042)-1=0.043). Thus, Proposition 1b is 
supported. The results indicate that foreign senior managers from countries with a low level 
of LTO are associated with a short longevity of IJVs, whereas Chinese senior managers 
prefer stability and support longevity in IJVs. Taken together, we report consistent evidence 
which suggests a link between the longevity of IJVs and management control by partners 
from countries with different levels of LTO.  
 
The variable of the contribution to production by local Chinese JV parents (β=0.308; p<0.01) 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the contribution to production by local 
JV parents is a decisive factor affecting the longevity of IJVs. Hence, we have obtained 
supporting evidence of Proposition 2a. Specifically, 1% increase in the contribution to 
production by local Chinese JV parents increases IJV duration by 36.1% (e(0.308)-1=0.361).  
Finance contributed by foreign partners is positive and statistically significant in Model 1 and 
Model 2, but insignificant in the full model (Model 4). Thus, Proposition 2b is partially 
supported. There are also interaction effects between contributions and commitment made by 
the two partners and management control. It is intriguing to find that production contributed 
by a local JV parent negatively moderates the impact of Chinese senior managers on the 
longevity of JVs (β=-0.031; p<0.01), whereas finance contributed by a foreign partner 
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positively moderates the role of foreign management control and encourages longevity once a 
foreign partner has made substantial commitments to an IJV (β=0.047; p<.0.01). Hence, 
Propositions 3a and 3b are fully supported. The results suggest that production contributed by 
a local JV parent reduces the impact of Chinese senior management on the duration of IJVs 
by 3.2% (e(0.031)-1=0.032), whereas financial contributions by a foreign partner mitigates the 
negative impact of foreign senior management by increasing IJV duration by 4.8% (e(0.047)-
1=0.048). The joint marketing unit in IJVs’ configurations is positively associated with the 
stability and longevity of IJVs.   
 
In terms of the firms’ own characteristics, the results show a positive and significant 
association between size and the longevity of IJVs, suggesting that IJVs with a large size are 
more likely to exist for a long period. However, foreign ownership has a negative, significant 
impact on IJVs’ survival time. IJVs with a joint market unit tend to have an extended 
longevity. As shown in Table 5, adjusted R-squired is about 11% in our based line model and 
this figure has increased to 14% when interaction terms are considered.    
 
5. Discussion  
 
This study focuses on the factors affecting the longevity of IJVs in China and investigates the 
strategic interactions of the players in an IJV (foreign parent, local parent and IJV 
management) by adopting game theory and empirical analysis based on national perceptions 
of time horizons. The findings from our research have some theoretical, empirical and 
managerial implications.  
 
5.1. Theoretical and empirical implications 
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First, we have analyzed theoretical models, which formally show that foreign partners from 
nations with different levels of LTO affect the longevity of IJVs. Our analysis was based on 
the assumption that culture, contribution and knowledge acquisition are the important factors 
contributing to the longevity of IJVs. The conceptual framework was complemented with a 
game theoretical treatment of the strategic interactions of the parent firms in IJVs. Sino-
Foreign IJVs are characterized by different levels of LTO between the foreign and local 
players. We used LTO as pay-offs and showed the resulting differences in strategies leading 
to the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs. It is our contribution to consider the duration of Sino-
Foreign JVs as pay-offs in static and dynamic games.  
 
We develop a Prisoner’s Dilemma (static) game for the parent firms when choosing senior 
management for an IJV (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). This is a necessary step to show the 
sharing of information between the parents, and how they choose their strategic moves 
simultaneously. In a simultaneous move situation, the Nash Equilibrium for Chinese parents 
and their Japanese or Korean counterparts indicates that it is Pareto optimal for the parents to 
appoint senior management from the local firm as it brings a higher pay-off for both (Casson, 
1994; Myerson, 1991; Ott, 2006). The choice of pay-offs reflecting the longevity of the IJV 
as an outcome for the senior management helps to build a link between the theoretical model 
and managerial decisions in an IJV. 
 
Second, we have further analyzed the sequential moves of the players in the dynamic game. 
We chose an extensive form game to show the multi-person decision-making situation. Both 
players moved first in these games. The strategies of the players reflected the decisions in an 
IJV such as contributions to the IJV (production, finance) and senior management nationality 
(Chinese, Foreign). All of these strategy sets were dependent on whether the players 
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(Chinese, Foreign) have LTO. The pay-offs were measured as the longevity of the IJV (Ott, 
2013).  
 
Third, we tested the propositions derived from the theoretical models using firm-level 
primary survey data. We found that the degree of Chinese senior management control is 
positively associated with the longevity of IJVs, whereas the extent of foreign senior 
management control negatively affects the duration of IJVs. The results may reflect the fact 
that Chinese senior managers with a high level of LTO prefer to have a greater longevity of 
IJVs than those from the US or EU. These findings show that the longevity of IJVs not only 
depends on the contributions of the partners as found in prior literature (Inkpen and Beamish. 
1997; Lu and Beamish, 2006; Makino et al., 2007), but also the LTO of foreign partners. We 
have also found that a contribution to production made by Chinese parents has a significant 
and positive impact on the longevity of IJVs, whereas contributions through finance made by 
foreign parents have a limited positive and direct impact on the longevity of IJVs.  
 
Fourth, we further investigated the interaction between management control and 
contributions from parent firms and found compelling results. The contribution made by 
Chinese parents negatively moderates the impact of Chinese management control. This 
implies that contributions to production reduce the importance of Chinese senior management 
control on the longevity of IJVs. When Chinese parents contribute to production, IJVs tend to 
have a greater longevity, although Chinese managers have less control. Hence, there is a 
substitution effect between contribution to production and local management control. 
However, the financial contribution from foreign parents positively moderates the role of 
foreign management control, showing that the greater the financial contributions, the greater 
the effect foreign senior management has on the longevity of IJVs. The findings show that the 
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financial contribution or financial commitment from foreign parents mitigates the role of 
foreign senior management control in the longevity of an IJV, and this weakens the impact of 
a low level of LTO on the longevity of an IJV. The interaction results suggest that 
management control with different levels of LTO and different types of parent contributions 
jointly determine the longevity of IJVs.  
 
Finally, our study contributes to the discussion concerning foreign and local firms and shows 
how they can acquire knowledge from each other, learn complementary skills and then exit 
the IJV (Park, 2011; Yao, et al 2013). Providing foreign partners with access to local 
knowledge through appointing local senior management will increase the longevity of IJVs 
since foreign partners are unable to internalize or acquire local knowledge, but instead rely on 
local senior management to access local knowledge. This implies that sharing local 
knowledge through local senior management control has a stabilizing effect on IJVs. The 
findings show that when the local firm offers access to knowledge through the senior 
management then the IJV lives longer and absorptive effectiveness does not lead to pre-
mature break-up. 
 
5.2. Managerial Implications 
 
The theoretical propositions and empirical evidence have valuable managerial implications. 
The longevity of an IJV in China has always been a prominent topic and termination rates 
show clearly that this is an issue which cannot be neglected. In order to maintain the stability 
of IJVs, managers need to consider factors such as senior management control and foreign 
partners with different levels of LTO which can affect the longevity and stability of IJVs in 
China. Local senior management control has a direct impact on the stability of IJVs. This is 
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valuable when it comes to the choice and strength of the JV management and the reported 
difficulties between the different management groups in IJVs in China (Walsh et al. 1999; 
Nielson and Nielson, 2011). In addition, the choice of contribution can lead to an additional 
benefit: if the parent moves from market and/or marketing-related contributions to 
production, the IJV should be more stable. Overall, it seems that such start-up decisions have 
an impact on the longevity of IJVs in China.  
Similarly, a shift from local knowledge acquisition to local knowledge access constitutes a 
strong source of stability. Setting up an IJV is easier when local knowledge is complemented 
by other sources of knowledge such as marketing, technology and management. Western 
parent firms need to take a long-term perspective and adopt their strategies to a longer time 
horizon when forming a Sino-Foreign JV. Overall, the endogenous factors of contributions 
and senior management control, as well as LTO, lead to the longevity of an IJV. 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
 
We should acknowledge some limitations of the study. First, we tested the theoretical 
propositions using cross-sectional data. In future studies, insightful findings may be drawn by 
conducting longitudinal data analysis to capture the dynamic dimension of factors affecting 
the longevity of IJVs. Second, while our study is based on an implicit assumption that LTO, 
as a distinctive feature of Chinese culture, plays a crucial role in the longevity of IJVs, other 
dimensions of national culture, such as power distance, collectivism and uncertainty 
avoidance may also affect the longevity of IJVs. Future research should consider the impact 
of multiple dimensions of national culture on this issue. A related point is that this study has 
mainly focused on the impact of a distinctive feature of Chinese culture on the duration of 
IJV and has provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between long-term orientation 
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and the stability of IJVs in China. However, other factors may also affect this relationship, 
e.g. the age of founders or provincial regulations on IJVs. This may be one of the reasons for 
a relatively low R-squired in our estimations. Future research should consider other factors 
which affect the longevity of IJVs. Third, focusing on the longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs, we 
are unable to distinguish unplanned termination or failed IJVs due to data availability. Future 
studies should examine the determinants of both survival and failure of IJVs simultaneously. 
Finally, although our test shows that the common methods bias is not a major concern, we 
still need to recognise this as a limitation of our study, given that the data of our study were 
generated from the same respondents at the same time. Future studies should use data from 
difference sources, such as survey based data and secondary data to minimize the impact of 
common method variance.   
 
6. Conclusions 
  
This study is one of the first to examine the longevity of IJVs by applying a theoretical 
approach and empirical tests. We argue that the study extends the extant literature in three 
main ways. First, by constructing game theoretical models we have provided theoretical 
insights into the determinants of IJV longevity. These theoretical propositions help to extend 
the existing literature which has overlooked the inter-play of factors affecting the longevity 
of IJVs (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Park and Ungson, 1997).  
 
Second, most existing research tends to take the longevity of IJVs as given when examining 
their stability and performance (Child and Yan, 2003; Fey and Beamish, 2001; Lu and Xu, 
2006; Makino et al., 2007). Deviating from prior studies, we investigate how senior 
management control with different national levels of LTO and contributions made by parent 
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firms affect the longevity of IJVs, thus providing new insights into the factors affecting the 
longevity of IJVs. We demonstrate this initially using theoretical modeling, and then we 
provide empirical evidence, which supports our theoretical propositions. The application of 
simultaneous move games and sequential move games in IJVs showed the strength of a 
prescriptive approach as a basis for empirical investigation. In doing so, we fill a significant 
research gap, where existing studies have over-emphasized empirical tests without any 
theoretical foundation. The empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
This contributes to the literature by indicating that a game theoretical approach can help 
managerial multi-person decision making.  
 
Third, we have further examined the interactions between management control and 
contributions from IJV parents. The findings add a new dimension to determinants of the 
longevity of IJVs. They also show that longevity depends upon a complex inter-play 
between management control with different degrees of LTO and contributions made by 
parent firms. In particular, the results highlight the importance of local knowledge access 
through local senior management control in the survival of IJVs. We were able to 
theoretically and empirically distinguish between the effect of knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge access contributing to longevity of IJVs. We found that IJVs which provide 
knowledge access via local senior management last longer. The differential effect of access 
to, and acquisition of, local knowledge emphasizes and provides a new explanation for the 
longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs (Buck, Liu and Ott, 2010; Yao et al., 2013). 
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Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma for Sino-Japanese JV - choice of senior managers, 
simultaneous moves  
 Japanese/Korean partner 
Senior Manager Chinese                               Senior Manager 
Japanese                 
 
Chinese 
partner 
Senior 
Manager 
Chinese 
 
Senior 
Manager 
Japanese and 
Korean 
(10,10) NE (15,0) 
(0,15) (9,9) 
 
Table 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma for Sino– US/EU JVs 
 US/EU partner 
Senior Manager Chinese                               Senior Manager 
US                 
 
Chinese 
partner 
Senior Manager  
Chinese 
 
Senior Manager 
US/EU 
(10,10) NE (12,0) 
(0,12) (5,5) 
 
Table 3: Contributions of Parent firms  
 
 
 
Local firms 
Foreign firm 
Technology Marketing Finance 
Production (cT, cT)  (cT, cM) (cT, cF) 
Market Knowledge  (cM, cT) (cM, cM) (cM, cF) 
Finance (cF, cT) (cF, cM) (cF, cF) 
Source: Ott (2006) 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
 Mean Std. Dev 1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1. Longevity   9.906  6.387  1.000          
2. Chinese Senior 
managers  0.622 
  
0.222  0.226 1.000          
3. Foreign Senior 
managers   0.377 
 
1.472  0.109  0.389 1.000         
4. Contribution: 
production  0.906 
  
0.292  0.046 -0.115 -0.099 1.000       
5. Contribution: finance  0.451  0.526 0.108 -0.065 -0.014  0.027 1.000      
6. US-European and 
Chinese IJV  0.488 
  
0.501 -0.037  0.128 -0.039 -0.039  0.023 1.000     
7. Foreign ownership 
stakes  0.572 
  
19.687 -0.055 -0.109  0.117  0.137 -0.031 -0.102 1.000    
8. Joint marketing unit  0.155  0.363  0.088  0.059  0.088 -0.040 -0.029  0.127  0.073 1.000   
9. Size  4.844  1.341  0.266  0.418  0.352  0.010 -0.111 -0.045 -0.0126  0.008 1.000  
10 .Tianjin 0.291  0.455  0.052 -0.021 -0.029 -0.254  0.194 -0.026 -0.039 -0.160 -0.089 1.000  
11. Qingdao  0.169 0.376 -0.175  0.015  0.139 -0.069  0.059 -0.165 -0.016  0.015  0.028 -0.289 
47 
 
Table 5: Determinants of the longevity of IJVs  
Independent Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
P1a: The percentage of Chinese 
senior managers on the board 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
P1b: The percentage of foreign 
senior managers on the board  
-0.010*** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.042** 
(0.014) 
P2a Contribution by local JV 
parent: Production  
0.141** 
(0.069) 
0.283*** 
(0.065) 
0.103* 
(0.042) 
0.308** 
(0.115) 
P2b: Contribution by foreign 
partner: Finance 
0.200*** 
(0.069) 
0.374*** 
(0.096) 
0.073 
(0.075) 
0.076 
(0.166) 
P3a Production Contributed by 
local JV Parent x the percentage 
of Chinese senior managers on 
the board  
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
  
-0.031** 
(0.012) 
 
P3b Finance contributed by 
foreign partner x the percentage 
of foreign senior managers on 
the board   
 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.047** 
(0.015) 
 
Control  variables 
  
 
 
 
Dummy for EU-US IJVs 
  
-0.030 
(0.077) 
-0.055 
(0.047) 
-0.010 
(0.040) 
-0.034 
(0.081) 
Foreign ownership stakes in JVs 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
JV configuration: Joint 
marketing unit 
0.175*** 
(0.078) 
0.227** 
(0.060) 
0.157** 
(0.043) 
0.182† 
(0.106) 
Size  0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0003** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Location for Qingdao  
-0.291** 
(0.094) 
-0.357** 
(0.071) 
-0.293*** 
(0.059) 
-0.296** 
(0.114) 
Location for Tianjin 
0.046 
(0.075) 
0.074 
(0.055) 
0.059 
(0.044) 
0.060 
(0.096) 
C 
2.133** 
(0.149) 
2.010** 
(0.134) 
2.267** 
(0.093) 
2.204** 
(0.223) 
Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.128 0.132 0.141 
Observations  213 213 213 213 
Note: ***, **, * and † represent the 0.01%, 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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FIGURES:  
Figure 1: Main route to Longevity of Sino-Foreign JVs  
 
    Finance, Technology 
Foreign Parent 
   LTO Foreign Contribution Foreign SM Knowledge Access 
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  Local  Local Senior Manager  
   
Local Parent   Local Knowledge 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Choice of Senior Management in Sequential Moves 
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Figure 3: Interaction between the Contributions and Choice of Management 
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APPENDIX:  
 
Chinese-IJVs in High-Tech industry in Beijing, Tianjin and Qingdao  
 
 
A1. Name of Chinese-IJV and city: 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
A2. Name and nationality of senior manager respondent: 
 
________________________________  
 
A3. Name of JV parent firm(s), their national origins and website address (if any) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A4. How many years has the company been established?                    
 
A5. How many employees does the company have currently?   
 
A6. The percentage of expatriates in total employees?             
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A7. The percentage of local managers in total employees?  
 
A8. How many Chinese senior managers on the board?                              
 
A9. How many foreign senior managers on the board? 
 
A10. Current ownership stakes in JV by nationality: Investment by Chinese 
partner____________% 
 
A11. Current ownership stakes in JV by nationality: Investment by foreign 
partner___________% 
 
A12. Contribution by foreign JV parent:       
a) Finance     
b) Technology   
c) Foreign marketing                   
 
A13. Contribution by local JV parent:    
a)  Local knowledge   
b) Local Marketing 
c) Production                                                                                         
 
 
A14. JV configuration (tick boxes) 
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 Does your JV have a: 
 
a) Joint Research Unit?   
                                                   
                   
b) Joint Production or Service Provision Unit? 
 
  
c) Joint Marketing Unit? 
 
 
d) Joint Distribution Unit? 
 
